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Abstract 
The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the 
concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment 
employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent 
properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more 
complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically 
emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not 
possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically 
emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis 
relating to system limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is 
fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. In the perspective of a modified 
definition of free will, the character of the physical interactions of the brain's neural 
system is subsequently studied. As an ontologically open system, it is asserted that its fu-
ture states are undeterminable in principle. We argue that this leads to freedom of the will.  
 
1  Introduction 
Understanding consciousness is a central problem in philosophy. The literature produced 
through the centuries, relating to the 'mind-body' - problem, is also huge. A subset of over 
3500 articles has been collected by Chalmers (2016). An apparent contradiction lies in the 
fact that while we normally seek scientific understanding from a reductionist perspective, 
in which the whole is understood from its constituents, consciousness has for millions of 
years evolved into an extremely complex system with advanced high-level properties. 
The theoretical difficulties we have faced strongly suggest that fundamentally new ideas 
are needed for the mind-body problem to reach its resolution. In this work it is argued that 
emergence, combined with results from algorithmic information theory, is such an idea. 
The meaning of these concepts will shortly be discussed; we may here briefly state that 
emergence relates to complex systems with characteristics that are difficult or impossible 
to reduce to the parts of the systems and algorithmic information theory concerns 
relationships between information and computing capacity. We reach the conclusion that 
the mind is epistemically strongly emergent, which by definition implies that the mind-
body problem cannot be solved reductionistically. Reductionistic understanding of the 
subjective aspects of consciousness, like introspection and qualia, is therefore not 
possible. The concept of 'explanatory gap' (Levine, 1983) is thus justified. 
McGinn, in his influential work "Can we solve the mind-body problem?" (McGinn, 1989) 
also concludes that the mind cannot be understood, but on other grounds. He focuses on 
the ability to understand phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995), and find that we 
humans, because of "cognitive closure" are not able to solve this 'hard problem of 
consciousness' (Chalmers, 1995). With the reservation "the type of mind that can solve it 
is going to be very different from our" McGinn does not fully exclude that consciousness 
can be given some kind of explanation, an optimism not supported in this work. 
But how is freedom of the will related to the mind-body problem? We have devised a 
thought experiment which features a process that can be shown to be strongly emergent in 
the epistemic sense. The close relation to neurological functions of consciousness leads to 
the conclusion that also consciousness is epistemically strongly emergent. Furthermore we 
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will argue that consciousness, due to its particular complexity considered as a global 
system, is ontologically emergent. Chalmers (2006) finds, on intuitive rather than on 
formal grounds, that the mind is 'strongly emergent'; a term used in the same meaning as 
'ontologically emergent'. 
The ontologically emergent character of consciousness resolves the contradiction we have 
long been facing for the freedom of the will; on the one hand, our volitional actions 
should occur deterministically quite as we wish to see them executed, but on the other 
hand determinism should not force our thoughts and intentions upon us. This explains the 
seemingly strange choice of title for this work. Of crucial importance is the use of a 
reformulation of the common definition 'ability to do otherwise' to a scientifically testable 
definition of free will. We here also touch upon the somewhat neglected circumstance that 
if we indeed could understand consciousness, it follows that the will cannot be free. 
Definitions are important in this work. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is 
that several aspects of the concepts of consciousness and freedom of will often are used in 
different ways by different philosophers, neuroscientists and others. Furthermore, it is 
sometimes unclear which definition is assumed. This may be understandable on the basis 
of that consciousness, not least semantically, is an elusive concept. The problem is rooted 
in its unique character, causing attempts for a definition to contain circular elements of 
some kind. The influential early characterisation of Locke (1690) "consciousness is the 
perception of what passes in a man's own mind" suffers from reference to the subjective 
term "perception". Nagel's (1974) characterisation "there is something that it is like to be 
that organism - something it is like for the organism" has gained popularity, although "is 
like" refers back to the subject itself, that is to consciousness. A more exhaustive and 
recent discussion of possible criteria for and meanings of conscious states can be found in 
Van Gulick (2014). However, either of the above formulations sufficiently catches the 
subjective components of consciousness that are referred to in this work, thus we here 
consider phenomenal consciousness. When we discuss other key concepts, attempts will 
be made to render the treatment more precise, in some cases using formalisations from 
physics and mathematics.  
The second reason for the need for clear definitions is simply that binding arguments 
requires precision (Carnap, 1950). The consequence of such specifications may of course 
be that the definitions of some philosophers are excluded; the results of this article should 
be seen in this perspective. 
We begin by discussing what requirements must be placed on a solution of the mind-body 
problem. It is then argued that such a solution cannot be found. The core of the argument 
is that the epistemically strongly emergent nature of consciousness precludes 
understanding of it in a reductionist sense. In the subsequent section we show that the 
ontologically emergent character of consciousness dissolves the deterministic 
contradiction we have been facing for the freedom of the will. Finally follows discussion 
and conclusion. 
 
2  What is required of a solution to the mind-body problem? 
The goal of the mind-body problem research is to find a theory that explains the 
relationship between mental and physical states and processes. The sub-problem which by 
far has attracted the most interest concerns the question how consciousness can be 
understood. We may initially ask the question: what is required from an adequate theory? 
Chaitin (1987) has clarified the meaning of the necessary requirement that a theory must 
be inherently less complex than what it describes; in his terminology it must to some 
extent be 'algorithmically compressible' in relation to what it should explain. Let us 
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illustrate this by an example. A relationship y = f(x) has been established to explain a 
phenomenon, but the precise dependence is not known. A series of experiments that 
generate N data points (xi,yi); i:1…N has thus been performed. Clearly, a polynomial Y(x) 
of degree N-1 (N coefficients) can always be fitted to be drawn through all the data points 
in an xy-diagram. Is it a theory? The answer is no, for the simple reason that Y(x) does not 
explain anything; it is always possible to draw a polynomial of degree N-1 exactly 
through N data points. Had we instead adapted a polynomial of lower degree through all 
the points, say a second order polynomial through 10 data points, then we would have a 
theory worthy of the name; it predicts more than it must. That it is algorithmically 
compressible means that it can be formulated using fewer bits of binary information than 
for Y(x). Simply put: a proper theory must be simpler than the phenomenon it describes, 
otherwise it does not explain anything. 
We will in this work make use of the discrete logistic equation for comparisons with the 
neurological processes that form the basis of consciousness. This equation can be 
formulated as the discrete recursive relation xn+1 = λxn(1-xn), n:0…nmax, where the positive 
integer nmax can be chosen freely. The discrete logistic equation then iteratively generates 
new numbers xn+1 for increasing values of numbers n. The parameter λ and the start value 
x0 must first be selected. We can now ask: is there an explicit theory for the value xn+1, 
that is is there a function u(k) which satisfies the relation xk = u(k), being algorithmically 
compressible as compared to repeated use of the iterative relationship xn+1 = λxn(1-xn)? Of 
course we can form x1 = λx0(1-x0), x2 = λx1(1-x1) = λλx0(1-x0)(1-λx0(1-x0)) and so on. This 
latter route is however not feasible; for large n we will find that xn+1 becomes extremely 
complex; this way of searching u(k) does not result in a valid theory. Alternatively 
formulated: the binary bits needed to represent these terms is at least of the same order as 
the bits representing the numbers x1, x2, x3... themselves! Unfortunately, it can be shown 
that the question must be answered in the negative; no matter how we try it is not possible 
(except for a very few values of λ) to derive a theory, that is a compact, explicit 
expression for u(k).  
The cause of the problem is that the discrete logistic equation is a nonlinear recursive 
equation. Let us, for a moment, instead consider the simpler linear recursive equation xn+1 
= A+λxn , n:0…nmax, where A is a constant, for which the general term xk can be derived in 
explicit form simply as xk  = x0λk +A(1-λk)/(1-λ) for λ ≠ 1 and as xk = x0 +Ak when λ = 1. 
The solution is expressed using only a few mathematical symbols; it is thus 
algorithmically compressible (may be represented by fewer digital bits of information) as 
compared to the solution xk obtained iteratively by forming x1 = A+λx0, x2 = A+λx1 = 
A+λ(A+λx0), x3 = A+λx2 = A+λ(A+λ(A+λx0)) and so on. This explicit solution was 
analytically available because of the low complexity involved in the solution of linear 
equations as compared to nonlinear. Furthermore, the solution for xk is derived 
mathematically by using well-known axioms and theorems; consequently we can 
theoretically explain the values xk for the linear recursive equation. 
We have here employed examples from mathematics, but the reasoning applies generally 
when we seek any kind of formal explanation or theory for a phenomenon. As a result, a 
theory cannot explain consciousness if it relates to systems of the same level of 
complexity (like other minds). Understanding is only reached from theories that are less 
complex than consciousness itself and relate to already established knowledge; in other 




3  Emergence stands in the way 
The emergent character of consciousness is still debated in the philosophical literature 
(Kim 1999, Kim 2006, Chalmers 2006). We will here argue that consciousness is both 
epistemically strongly emergent and ontologically emergent. Consciousness thus has 
features that are not reducible to the properties of its components. The standard expression 
'not reducible to' expresses that the characteristics of the low-level components of the 
phenomenon are insufficient to determine high-level properties. By 'low-level' and 'high-
level' we refer to the parts of and integrated wholes of a system or phenomenon, 
respectively. This is of course central to the mind-body problem since it settles the issue 
of the 'explanatory gap' (Levine, 1983); an unbridgeable gap exists between the theories 
we can formulate on the basis of the basic physiology of the brain and the subjective, 
cognitive function of consciousness. A consequence is that behaviour of consciousness is 
unpredictable, a relationship being of importance as we later approach the problem of 
freedom of will. First we turn to investigate the emergent character of consciousness. 
 
3.1  Definition of epistemical and ontological emergence 
For this we define epistemically strong emergence in the following way: A high-level 
phenomenon is epistemically strongly emergent with respect to phenomena on low-level if 
the latter constitute the basis for the high-level phenomenon and if the theories that 
describe the low-level phenomena cannot predict behaviour at high-level. 
Ontological emergence, in turn, can be defined by replacing "if the theories that describe 
the low-level phenomena cannot predict behaviour at high-level" with "if its behaviour is 
not reducible to processes at low-level". It may be argued that any phenomen or behaviour 
in a physicalist world would be reducible to low-level properties since we assume that the 
physical is all there is. But this is not what is meant by reduction; supervenience does not 
imply reducibility. An ontologically irreducible phenomenon, if it exists, would not be 
determined by its low-level-properties or behaviour; it would not follow a statistical or 
law-like behaviour in relation to its low-level components. Loosely formulated it can be 
said that its behaviour comes as a surprise to nature. This distinction is crucial and we will 
indeed see that even if determinism holds, there are systems where extreme complexity 
can, in an ontological sense, ’shield’ the dynamics of a high-level phenomenon from that 
of its associated low-level phenomena. An important consequence is that these systems 
are uncontrollable in principle. It may here also be remarked that there is no need to 
distinguish between 'strong' and 'weak' ontological emergence. 
The requirements for ontological emergence are indeed harder to satisfy than those for 
epistemic emergence; the former relates to intrinsic properties of the system rather than to 
knowledge about and theories for the system. The term epistemically weakly emergent, in 
turn, is frequently used for systems that can be simulated on a computer but otherwise 
would be characterized as epistemically strongly emergent. This definition will be adopted 
here as well. Emergence is naturally related to complexity. The brain features about 100 
billion nerve cells (neurons), each connected to thousands of other nerve cells via 
dendrites. A model of the mind must be able to handle a corresponding complexity. As we 
have just discussed, algorithmic information theory implies that 'models' or 'theories' that 
cannot be algorithmically compressed to a complexity lower than that of the data they 
describe do not measure up. It is however not entirely clear how emergent properties arise 
in complex systems. It would be of great help if we could actually point to a relevant 
example. Our approach will thus be to, using a thought experiment, provide an example of 
a system with strongly emergent properties, related to neural processes of the brain but 




3.2  The Jumping robot 
Our thought experiment is the following. Let us imagine a number of robots that are 
deployed on an isolated island. All robots are designed in the same way. They are 
programmed to be able to freely walk around the island and perform certain tasks. The 
robots can communicate with each other and are also instructed to carry out their duties as 
effectively as possible. If a robot becomes more efficient by performing a certain action, it 
should 'memorize' it and 'teach' the other robots the same skill. Let us concentrate on the 
behaviour of one of these robots and call the thought experiment 'the Jumping robot'. 
In order to support the robots to move about freely, their movement patterns are partially 
determined by the discrete logistic equation just described. The iterative equation xn+1 = 
λxn(1-xn) generates new numbers xn+1  in the interval [0,1] when x0 (also in the range 
[0,1]), and λ are set. These numbers affect how the robot should coordinate its joints, 
muscles and body parts, but the robot is programmed only to use information leading to 
safe motion without falling. Let us put λ = 4. It can then be shown mathematically that, for 
almost any choice of x0, a chaotic sequence in the interval [0,1] is generated already for 
moderately large n. 
A chaotic sequence is characterised by that it is not algorithmically compressible (Chaitin, 
1987); there is no theory that can predict the value of xk for large k. If we consider 
consecutive xk, xk+1, xk+2 and so on, these numbers will seem completely random. But the 
interesting and important fact is that they actually are deterministic; each number in the 
sequence is unambiguously defined by the former and so on in a long chain. Let us 
summarize: in the general case, there exists no algorithmically compressible explicit 
expression xk = u(k) for the discrete logistic equation and for the case λ = 4, there is 
neither any empirical opportunity to establish a law for the generated values. 
Now assume that it would be of great value if the robots could perform jumps without 
falling. An attempt is thus made to learn a robot this behaviour. From a large number of x0 
values different sequences of numbers are generated, using the discrete logistic equation, 
in the hope that one of these sequences would correspond to movements which when 
combined result in the robot performing a jump. We ignore here that the procedure is 
obviously cumbersome; the complexity is partly caused by the fact that the robot consists 
of a large amount of joints, muscles and other bodyparts that should be coordinated, partly 
by the ignorance as to what movements the robot would need to perform for a successful 
jump and partly by that the discrete logistic equation does not allow control of the 
movements. After numerous unsuccessful attempts the task is thus given up; the robots 
cannot be 'taught' to jump. 
Instead now initiate robots with random x0 and leave them to themselves for some time on 
the island, after which we return. To our surprise, we now find that several of the robots 
make their way not only by walking, but also by jumping over obstacles. They have thus 
developed an emergent property or behaviour. We cannot explain how one or more of the 
robots aquired the property to be able to jump; no theory is to be found. As we saw, we 
could neither simulate the behaviour. If so, this would have been an example of 
epistemically weak emergence. The robot's behaviour is thus epistemically strongly 
emergent. A main point here is that the emergent ability to jump per se is both fully 
comprehensible to us as well as fully plausible in the sense that we can imagine that a 
certain sequential use of joints, muscles and bodyparts may indeed accomplish this 
behaviour, at the same time realizing that some kind of chance or evolution beyond our 
modelling capacity was required in the light of the complexity involved. There is no 
magic involved in the process, rather the behaviour is similar to that of random mutations 
in the genome of an individual organism, producing improved characteristics. The 
behaviour, however, does not appear to be ontologically emergent since we know that the 
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robot's capacity to jump really is reducible to its finite number of parts. Similar 
conclusions about the emergent properties of nonlinear systems have been reached by 
other authors (Silberstein and McGeever, 1999). 
 
3.3  The emergent character of consciousness 
What then is the relevance of this epistemically strongly emergent system for the mind-
body problem? It could be argued that we can make detailed studies of a jumping robot, 
simply ignoring how it reached its emergent state, in order to understand its functions and 
presumably build copies that perform the same movement patterns and therefore also can 
jump. Maybe we could build consciousness in a similar manner? By a careful procedure, 
we may perhaps map all the required details of the state of the robot to its ability to jump.  
This procedure does not, however, catch the complete behaviour of the robot which 
should include the time-dynamics of its 'brain', being governed by the discrete logistic 
equation. Since this equation is chaotic, it is numerically impossible to work backwards 
indefinitely from a known, present state to accurately determine prior states that controls 
the robot's actions. For this reason a theory for the Jumping robot cannot be developed. 
Thus at best we can hope to build 'zombie robots' that copy the mechanical behaviour of 
the Jumping robots but not their associated 'brain' functions.  
Moreover, our understanding of a singular emergent property or behaviour does not imply 
a complete understanding of any possible property or behaviour of the system. Having 
investigated all relevant aspects pertinent to the robot's jumping ability does not imply that 
we now can control the robot to, for example, jump on one leg only. A posteriori 
understanding of emergent systems is not sufficient for a priori understanding of their 
properties.  The emergent states of the human brain, to be discussed shortly, must be 
understood similarly. A complete mapping of an individual thought process to its 
supervenient neural network certainly does not guarantee understanding of qualitatively 
different thought processes.  
Furthermore, it is well known that mental processes suffer from an additional complexity, 
not related to emergence: they cannot be scientifically related to externally measurable 
properties in the same way as for the robots; the conscious properties of the mind are 
predominantly accessible internally or subjectively. Consciousness thus cannot be 
straightforwardly understood from basic externally controllable, non-emergent physical 
states, because the resulting characteristic emergent properties cannot be ascertained 
objectively. Our focus is here on emergence, so we will not dwell on this difficulty any 
further.  
Let us now investigate the degree of emergence associated with consciousness. The 
human brain is vastly more complex than the discrete logistic equation. In brief, its 
approximately 100 billion neurons communicate as follows. Via the so-called dendrites, 
each neuron can be reached by electrochemical signals from tens to tens of thousands 
(average 7000) neighbouring neurons. The contributions from these signals are weighted 
in the neuron's cell body to an electrical potential. When this reaches a certain threshold, 
the neuron sends out a pulse along a nerve fibre, which in turn may connect via synapses 
to several other cell dendrites. The outgoing signal from a neuron is thus a step function 
rather than a continuous, nonlinear function of the incoming signal. This justifies the 
choice of the discrete logistic equation rather than its continuous counterpart in the 
thought experiment. Neurons fire about 100 signals per second with signal speeds of up to 
100 meters per second. The behaviour varies from neuron to neuron. For networks of 
neurons, it is found that nonlinear functions called sigmoids, with S-shaped dependence of 
the input signals, provide realistic models. Mathematically, sigmoids are closely related to 
the discrete logistic equation.  
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We can thus conclude that communication within the neural network of the brain occurs 
nonlinearly and discretely with a complexity far exceeding that of the simple logistic 
equation. The behaviour of the latter is, as we have seen, characterised as algoritmically 
incompressible. Since, in a physicalist perspective, it is the neural processes of the brain 
that underlies consciousness, it follows that a theory for phenomenal consciousness 
cannot be constructed. Thus consciousness, and similarly subconsciousness, is 
epistemically strongly emergent. In the same way that we could not reductionistically 
explain the Jumping robot's behaviour, we can not reductionistically explain the properties 
of consciousness; the mind-body problem is unsolvable.  
We may now ask whether consciousness is also ontologically emergent; are the properties 
of consciousness irreducible to the lower level states and processes that form the basis of 
consciousness, the ones that consciousness supervene on? The meaning of 'cannot be 
reduced to' for this question need be illuminated. Let us return to the example of the 
Jumping robot. The property to be able to jump is not ontologically emergent for the 
reason that in an objective meaning this property was an option within reach for the 
system, although its details were unknown to us. By 'objective' we mean that the various 
possible sequences of numbers being generated by the discrete logistic equation, of which 
at least one potentially lead to jumping behaviour, correspond to an amount of 
information that is manageable in principle. This latter statement demands clarification, 
since we now have made contact with the consequences of quantum mechanics and 
information theory for ontology.   
It has been shown (Lloyd 2002, Davies, 2004) that the information storage capacity of the 
universe is limited by the available quantum states of matter inside the causal horizon. 
The latter is the distance, limited by the finite speed of light, outside which no events may 
be causally influential. Using multiple arguments it is found that the order of 10120 bits of 
digital information may be contained within this horizon. The fact that this result is an 
estimate is not essential; what matters here is that information storage capacity is limited 
to a magnitude of this nature. For a property or behaviour to be characterized as 
ontologically emergent it must therefore exhibit a complexity transcending some 10120 bits 
of digital information; only then can we say that there is no possibility, even in principle, 
to 'reduce' it to the low-level phenomena on which it is based. Note that ’ontology’ is used 
in this work in the traditional, philosophical sense and not as a reference to properties or 
interrelationships between entities used in computer science and information science. 
It would certainly be helpful if we could find a specific example of an ontologically 
emergent system. To this end, we note that emergence rarely is associated with the results 
of human activities, with design, but rather with evolution; the development of nature. 
Evolution has through natural selection access to a tremendous diversity of degrees of 
freedom and features a huge potential to generate emergent systems. An example from 
chemistry is myoglobin, an important oxygen binding molecule found in muscle tissue 
(Luisi, 2002). Here 153 amino acids are interconnected in a so-called polypeptide chain. 
Since there are 20 different amino acids, the number of possible combinations of chains 
amounts to the enormous number 20153 ≈ 10199, which corresponds to a number of digital 
bits much larger than 10120. Myoglobin is thus an ontologically emergent phenomenon in 
nature; the molecule is, in terms of optimized functions such as high oxygen affinity, not 
reducible to its low-level constituents. It could only evolve, it could not be designed. 
Returning to consciousness, we will now argue that individual thought processes are 
emergent. We recall that the example of the Jumping robot was used for illustrating strong 
epistemic emergence; a certain robot property (or behaviour or state) X was to be 
designed but our modelling capacity, even using computer simulations, turned out to be 
insufficient to accomplish X. This is precisely what we mean by strong epistemic 
emergence; high-level behaviour could not be predicted or controlled from low-level 
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behaviour. However, since the possible number of combinations of robot joints, muscles 
and other bodyparts is limited we have reason to assume that the computational capacity 
of the universe, if accessible, would suffice for solving the problem. Thus X is an example 
of strong epistemic but not ontological emergence. Next, we found an instance Y of 
ontological emergence in the myoglobin protein molecule. Its high oxygen affinity is 
ontologically emergent because of its extreme complexity. Just as X surprisingly appeared 
among the robots on the island, Y develops as a ’surprise’ to nature itself.  
Let us proceed along the same lines as earlier: we wish to determine whether 
consciousness entails any property Z that is ontologically emergent. More precisely: given 
the physical resources on which consciousness supervenes, is it possible to reduce all 
occuring properties or behaviour of the mind ontologically to these low-level processes? 
Is the information processing capacity of the universe sufficient for this task? Let us 
imagine a human-like individual in a situation where conscious choices need be made. 
This could, for example, be to select courses from a menu at a restaurant. The final choice 
will be influenced by factors such as earlier taste experiences and attained preferences, 
allergies, views on appropriate diets, present state of hunger, the internal matches between 
starters, main courses and desserts, memories from possible earlier visits to the restaurant, 
views on suitable accompanying drinks as well as prices. Just as we interested us for the 
jumping ability of the robots we are now interested in the individual’s choice of a three-
course dinner. What are the required low-level conditions for that the individual should 
have the property of choosing a certain, specified combination of these dishes? We will 
now argue that this property is an example of Z.  
Assume that one-thousandth of the 1011 neurons of the brain are involved in the associated 
thought process. Assume also that there is some redundancy, or cluster behaviour, so that 
only one-thousandth of these in turn need to actively be controlled. This leaves N = 105 
neurons to be initiated. It can be assumed that their states are binary; only two states exist 
for each. Thus there are 2N possible combinations of neural states. Clearly even a small 
fraction of these possible states is much larger than 10120. Similarly as for the oxygen 
affinity of the myoglobin molecule it is not possible to design, even in principle, a thought 
process that would correspond to, for example, the choice of a particular three-course 
meal. This extremely complex mental process has evolved to take place at a level that is 
not reducible to low-level processes. As a result thought processes of the mind generally 
are ontologically emergent; they cannot be reduced to the low-level components, the 
neurons, that they supervene on. As we will argue shortly, this opens up for 'downward 
causation'.  
Needless to say, we could imagine even more complex examples of properties Z, 
including those related to subjective experiences.  
 
 
3.4  Neuroscience 
The neural networks of the brain communicate in discrete nonlinear processes to generate 
cognitive functions such as the abilities to feel pain, think, make choices and introspect. If 
these basic processes were linear, their behaviour could possibly be reduced to a theory. 
This theory would have lower complexity than what it describes since it would be 
algorithmically compressible. Nonlinear systems like the neural network of the brain, 
however, generally feature higher complexity. Since the neural network associated with 
consciousness is nonlinear to its nature and epistemically strongly emergent, we have 
argued that a theory cannot be constructed for it. Thus consciousness cannot be 
understood within a reductionistic framework. This holds regardless if we seek a 
computational theory of mind or any other formally reductionistic theory of mind. 
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It is of interest here to briefly discuss a quite different obstacle for understanding 
consciousness. Abandoning efforts for finding theories of consciousness, we may be 
inclined to instead turn to the possibility of artificially designing consciousness. In 
neuroscience there is a search for 'neural correlates of consciousness' (NCC), which form 
the neural processes in the brain that are directly linked to the individual's current mind 
activities.  
Let us say that NCC:s indeed can be identified to an extent that serious attempts to create 
conscious processes in artificial brains can be made. On each such experimental attempt 
the function must be ensured; the system must be diagnosed. Otherwise there is the 
possibility that we have designed an advanced system that externally behaves like a 
consciousness but actually lacks mental processes. The problem is here that essentially no 
fundamental limit exists for non-cognitive 'intelligence' of advanced computer programs. 
These would then, properly designed, be able to pass any kind of Turing test. In these 
tests, where the respondent is hidden so that the person performing the test does not know 
whether it communicates with a human or a machine, any machine that produces similar 
responses as humans when addressed are deemed intelligent on the level of a human.  
The Turing test is valuable for testing intelligence, but obviously is unreliable for testing 
consciousness. But what would then be an adequate diagnosis? Current definitions of 
phenomenal consciousness provide an answer: we are to ensure that the system can have 
subjective experiences. But since all measurement of the functions of consciousness must 
be done externally, that is by laboratory personnel using diagnostic equipment, the 
system's internal cognitive functions cannot be measured. There is simply no information 
externally available from the system that would be indistinguishable from that which can 
be produced by an advanced, but unconscious, computer program. We could be facing an 
intelligent robot, without ability for conscious behaviour. This is, as mentioned elsewhere, 
therefore not a viable route for solution of the mind-body problem.  
In short: understanding of a system implies the possibility of constructing it, with all of its 
functions. But since the intended function (generation of conscious thoughts) of the 
systems we may construct cannot not be experimentally verified, we can not say with 
certainty that we understand them.  
 
4  Consequences for free will 
Must we have the thoughts we have? Do our thoughts only happen, rather than being 
created by ourselves? Does determinism hold our will into an iron grip? The free will 
problem presumably is the most important existential problem and has generated shelf 
kilometers of literature throughout the centuries. One reason for the problematic situation 
is very likely the most common definition of free will itself: 'the ability to act differently'. 
Indeed, it is hard to see any opportunity for scientific methods to determine whether we 
actually can 'act differently' or not. How do we know whether an individual's actions are 
autonomous or predetermined? And why should even a free consciousness act differently 
in two identical situations? Many arguments about the will thus lead to uncertain terrains.  
 
4.1  Alternative definition of free will  
We here make an attempt to provide a definition of free will with characteristics that are 
scientifically decidable: A conscious individual has free will if its behaviour takes place 
according to its intentions, the intentions are not subconsciously generated and if the 
individual's mind is an ontologically open system. 
By 'will' we here refer to expressions by a cognitive system of preferenced future actions. 
Furthermore, by an 'ontologically open system' is meant a causal, physically closed 
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system for which the future behaviour is undeterminable and thus uncontrollable, even in 
principle. We will justify the definition as follows. Experience tells us that basic, lower 
level phenomena are causal and deterministic. Quantum mechanical statistical corrections 
must, of course, be taken into account as discussed below. If also the higher level 
neuronal functions of the conscious individual are determinable beforehand, it is obvious 
that its will is governed by laws outside its conscious control. This circumstance is a 
feature of the classical, deterministic argument against free will. Behaviour related to 
ontologically open conscious systems is, on the other hand, not directly reducible to 
earlier physical neural states. As argued in the following, this is typical for ontologically 
emergent behaviour. Individuals featuring ontologically emergent neural processes are 
ontologically undeterminable beforehand. They cannot be externally controlled, not even 
in principle. This is the crucial and decisive property we assign to ontologically open 
systems. Noteworthy is that ontological openness is possible also for systems that are 
deterministic (or essentially so) at lower-level, as shown below. Consequently the notions 
of compatibilism and incompatibilism are irrelevant here.  
Phenomena relating to classical open physical systems are generally causal, but 
indeterminable. These systems are open to external influence, and they are thus not 
guaranteed to evolve identically when repeatedly started from the same initial conditions. 
The associated dynamic processes should not be regarded as random or chancy; the point 
is that the system itself does not contain sufficient information about its future external 
states. This becomes clear if we extend the size of the system to also include all of its 
external influences. Such a system may be physically closed, causal and deterministic. We 
will, in the next section, argue that consciousness is ontologically open in spite of being a 
physically closed system.  
For the sake of completeness and accuracy we should, as mentioned, account for the 
implication of quantum mechanics that determinism does not fully apply at the very 
micro-level; the uncertainty principle shows that nature is 'blurry' at the sub-atomic and 
atomic particle levels. For larger clusters of particles, however, like the molecules that 
make up the neurons, this effect is of much less importance, because of so-called quantum 
decoherence. The concept of 'adequate determinism' has been coined to emphasize that the 
statistical determinism that results and is used here, in essence is correct in the 
macroscopic world, even if quantum phenomena are important for very small systems. 
Returning to the present definition of free will, we note that the desired actions of a free 
consciousness must not turn into anything other than intended; behaviour must be based 
on its intentions. If I wish to consider what to eat for dinner, such a reflection must be 
possible. My actions must consistently and adequately follow my will. The phrasing 'takes 
place according to its intentions' is deliberately somewhat vague; the precision we may 
strive for in our actions is sometimes not achieved; this is not because the will is not 
obeyed but rather from our physical and psychological limitations. Note that we also 
assume conscious individuals; it is not meaningful to talk about 'will' for other systems. 
Finally, the condition that 'the intentions are not subconsciously generated' is needed to 
ensure that the individual's 'brain' does not contain any hidden systems that manipulates it 
in a manner that consciousness, in spite of being controlled, experiences intentions as its 
own. So-called 'character decisions', decisions that we make without active reflection 
based on our experiences and consolidated positions, we treat in this context as conscious. 
We will return to these. 
In summary, we have cast the formulation 'the ability to act differently' into an alternative, 
scientifically decidable formulation in order to generate improved methodological 
conditions to handle the free-will problem. A condensation of the definition could be 
something like 'An individual that can realize conscious, unforced choices has free will'. 
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The task is now to address the inhibiting circumstance that the mind must feature a 
deterministic character in order to enable coherent thought processes and consistent 
performance of its intended actions, but at the same time feature an ontologically open 
future to permit self-caused actions. Free will implies that this potential contradiction is 
dissolved. It is at this point the emergent character of consciousness becomes crucial.  
It should be noted that if it really were the case that a true theory of consciousness could 
be designed, then there is no room for free will. Free will implies that the mind is 
epistemically strongly emergent, a fact that deserves more attention in the literature. The 
reason is simply that if the individual's behaviour would be epistemically computable or 
could be simulated, its behaviour would be predictable and controllable and thus not free. 
  
4.2  Consciousness and determinism 
We will now argue that consciousness is an ontologically open, high-level global system. 
The question is then how it would be possible for the brain's essentially deterministic 
atomic lower-level activity to lead to ontologically open behaviour at the higher inter-
neural levels related to consciousness, considering that man and consciousness are of the 
physical world.  
At this point it can be instructive to discuss a hypothetical Jumping robot. It is clear that if 
its functions were not epistemically emergent, we could control it. We could then device 
certain input to its 'brain' in order to produce a certain behaviour, like jumping. If the 
robot furthermore had conscious capabilities we could in principle fool it into believing 
that it chooses to jump out of free will by manipulating its memory and cognital functions. 
If its functions instead were characterised by epistemically strongly emergent behaviour, 
as in our thought experiment, it cannot be controlled. Consequently this robot is, in a 
sense, free in relation to us. Moving to an even higher level of complexity, we may next 
assume that the robot's behaviour is truly ontologically emergent. This extends the 
freedom of the robot since its future actions are undeterminable, even in principle. It may 
be objected, however, that there is no escape from the robot's deterministic dependence on 
its initial set-up and conditions in combination with the laws of nature. If the robot is 
repeatedly started from exactly the same conditions, its behaviour would be the same. 
This contradicts our intuitive perception of free will. We would certainly hesitate to assign 
free will to this robot. 
Experience shows that causality applies in our physical world. This means that the current 
state of a typical physical system, in terms of the positions and velocities of its 
microscopic constituents, provides a sufficient condition to take it to a subsequent state; 
cause results in effect. We endeavour to express the regularities of cause and effect as 
laws of nature. If new physical states can be found uniquely from previous states of the 
system, we talk about determinism. Stated equivalently: determinism implies that the 
evolution of a system, if repeatedly started from the same initial conditions, will always 
be identically the same. Everyday events, such as when the billiard cue hits the cue ball 
which subsequently knocks down the yellow ball in the hole, tempt us to believe that 
causality and determinism are equivalent concepts. But they are not. The future of a 
specified causal physical system may actually be undetermined, even disregarding the 
statistical nature of quantum mechanics. This happens when the system is open in some 
sense, that is when unaccounted external phenomena may have an influence. 
Our everyday experiences could lead us to the erroneous conclusion that change and the 
underlying forces act instantaneously. All effects of forces in nature, that is changes of 
state, are in fact due to combinations of the four basic forms of interaction through 
exchange of particles called bosons. This interaction takes indeed a finite time; the lower 
limit is given by a key relationship in quantum mechanics called Heisenberg's uncertainty 
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principle (Lloyd, 2002). The limiting time is proportional to Planck's constant and 
inversely proportional to the system's average energy above the ground state, which for a 
one kilo system means that no more than 5·1050 changes of state are possible per second. 
In the entire visible universe, which dates back some 14 billion years and has a mass of 
1053 kg, in total a maximum of about 10121 changes of quantum states have occurred. 
Although this is a huge number it is not infinite. The universe's 'capacity to act and 
compute' is thus limited by Planck's constant and the available energy. As a consequence, 
the futures of very complex physical systems are 'unknown' even to nature at each instant 
in the sense that this information cannot be processed and obtained presently; it requires 
too much computational resources (Wolpert 2008). The fact that future states of very 
complex systems are ontologically undecided is of course important when discussing 
determinism and the relation to ontologically open systems. 
Let us now consider the behaviour of a hypothetical single conscious individual placed in 
a closed room, without contact with the outside world. Also assume that there is, in an 
objective sense, complete access to all information relevant to the individual including all 
initial and boundary conditions. We are interested in the character of the individual's 
behaviour in a certain future time interval. For the sake of argument let us first consider an 
imagined case of behaviour that we could deem as undeterminable with respect to the 
individual’s choices and actions. If the individual, before taking a decision, had the magic 
ability to consult a clever genie inhabiting some dimension otherwise unrelated to our 
physical world, the individual's future would clearly not be deterministically given. The 
influence of the genie’s advice on the individual’s behaviour would be similar to the case 
of external signals influencing an open physical system. Since the individual's decisions 
are not immediate consequences of its present physical state, we must infer that the will of 
this individual is not limited by any deterministic dependence on its initial set-up and 
conditions. In discussions of determinism, in a similar vein as that of Laplace in Essai 
philosophique sur les probabilities (1814), it is often asserted that given the positions and 
velocities of all particles in the universe, its future would be in principle determinable. It 
is sometimes forgotten, however, that the argument implicitly assumes the continual 
action of given laws of nature. The appearance of the genie violates this assumption. 
Returning to reality the genie of the thought experiment can, with the same result, be 
replaced by the individual's emergent thought processes in combination with preferences 
being acquired during its earlier life, now stored in its memory. Will is about planning and 
experiences are necessary prerequisites. These experiences are personal and rated 
subjectively, whereafter they are remembered and used as a basis for subsequent 
preferences. The preferences are consulted, similarly as the genie, before decisions are 
taken. Furthermore the preferences are the result of ontologically emergent processes 
where subjective positive or negative connotations have been related to various events, 
actions and choices.  
Alternatively formulated, consciousness, in any given time interval, acts as an open 
system in the sense that the memories associated with subjective preferences are 
ontologically unrelated to the physical situation. The fact that in principle it is possible to, 
atom by atom in a Laplacian sense, build the individual's entire network of coupled 
neurons is not relevant here. Such a system would still have built in subjective 
preferences, the character of which would be unknown and, as we have argued, with 
functions equivalent to conferring with an independent genie. Ontological emergence is 
again crucial in that it decouples the physical state of the system from its subjective 
properties and behaviour. This concludes our argument for that behaviour of conscious 
individuals is ontologically open.            
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Summarising, consciousness is an ontologically open system and thus undeterminable and 
uncontrollable in principle. We have argued that it is meaningless to say that the evolution 
of consciousness is deterministically given since at any instant ontologically emergent 
subjective experiences, stored as memories in the mind, govern the individual's behaviour.  
How could, we may wonder, such complex behaviour evolve in humans? Perhaps the 
most competitive evolutionary aspect of consciousness is its ability for planning in order 
to avoid dangers, gain advantages and to optimize longer time survival. Planning requires 
alternatives to compare with. The alternatives manifest themselves to us humans through 
experience; we are by necessity not born with fixed perceptions about the world since, for 
example, our environments differ depending on where we are born. Our experiences need 
storage, or memory, so that they can become conscious alternatives when we are about to 
make choices. Together with these objective experiences, we have also stored associated 
subjective impressions. In the process of planning, when making our choices, it is 
precisely the subjective impressions that influence our decisions. These are so-called 
'character decisions', discussed in the next section. Again, ontologically emergent and thus 
externally uncontrollable brain processes act so as to store personal and subjective 
impressions for subsequent use in decision making processes. This is certainly in line with 
our notion of free will.        
The effect of memory on consciousness to continuously modify it has the result that 
consciousness may act differently, even if external conditions are unchanged. Repeatedly 
facing identical external situations, conscious individuals can make new and different 
choices each time, as a result of recollections of subjective experiences of earlier 
instances.  
We have, from a physicalistic and thus monistic position, argued for that the mind is an 
ontologically open system. Interestingly, the same result seems to follow from a dualist 
perspective. To show this, assume for a moment that dualism holds; there is both a 
material and a somehow separated ’mental dimension’. What characterises activity in the 
mental dimension? Certainly not randomness; scientific analysis of mental behaviour 
speaks against this. But if the mental dimension features regularity and law-bound 
processes we face a similar question as when taking the physicalistic stance: what is the 
maximum freedom that can be excerted by the will, given the laws of nature? Thus a 
natural conclusion is that dualism cannot provide conscious will with higher degrees of 
freedom than those found within physicalism. 
To conclude, the mind's ontologically open high-level character is argued to be a result of 
the ontologically emergent nature of the causal processes in its complex neural network, 
combined with the limitations in nature's capacity for deterministically connecting present 
states to future states.  
 
4.3  Willed intentions and the role of subconsciousness 
Free will requires, according to the present definition, that individual behaviour takes 
place according to the individual's intentions. This condition is not really problematic; it 
is satisfied by our experiences. The individual's everyday functioning is completely 
dependent on that she consistently carries out what she decides. Does she want to make 
herself a cup of coffee, she does it. The exceptions that can be identified, such as shortage 
of coffee or that she cannot be bothered, are not about principal mental limitations but of 
physical or psychological disability or of limitations in the outside world. 
So far, we have presented arguments for that the combined consciousness/subconscious-
ness meets the requirements for free will. But few would regard this as sufficient; if our 
volitional decisions, in spite of their onthologically open origin, are unconsciously 
dictated to us it is difficult to speak of free will. There is evidence, however, that 
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consciousness in a number of situations exerts its will without significant influence from 
the subconscious. First, it should be noted that there is a spectrum of degrees of 
collaboration between the two. Our experiences of dreams show that subconsciousness 
may be active when we are not consciously aware. Driving a car along a well-known road 
is a well known example of collaboration between consciousness and subconsciousness. 
And participation in an intense discussion is an example of consciousness mainly acting 
on its own. But the independent role of consciousness and the will has been strongly 
questioned over the past few decades and some authors talk of "the illusion of free will". 
Support is partly found from neuroscience. A "readiness potential," being activated 
unconsciously well before we make conscious decisions, appears to reveal that the main 
decision-making takes place beyond consciousness. A pioneer in the field was Libet 
(1985). The experiments since then carried out within this field has, however, many 
possible sources of error and have endured severe criticism in several places (Klemm, 
2010 and Baumeister et al, 2011). 
In certain practical situations it is, from an evolutionary point of view, crucial that 
consciousness may act undisturbed. The need for rapid and well balanced decisions, as 
when we are driving and we suddenly need to consider how to avoid a car that suddenly 
wobbles into the roadway, is one example. In a very short time we need to perform a large 
number of considerations, including how to avoid colliding with people while at the same 
time ensure our own safety. The subconscious mind would not, with the associated delay 
that Libet's and other experiments show, have time to gather all the relevant information 
in order to survey the situation and in a short time deliver adequate decisions that do not 
conflict with our conscious perception and handling of the situation. Certainly, if 
conscious decisions would not be important in situations like these, evolution would have 
provided us with a mechanism that automatically disconnected consciousness in favour of 
subconsciousness, in a similar manner as when we react reflexively. 
Furthermore it is well known that, upon learning new knowledge and skills, performance 
is gradually taken over by the subconscious as we become more knowledgeable and 
skilful. But for the beginner who sits down at a piano, the subconscious mind is 
completely unprepared. There is no way for the subconscious to control the finger 
movements because it does not 'know' what should be done (Klemm, 2010). Obviously 
more research is needed to identify to which degree subconsciousness impacts on our 
actions, however we have here given examples where the subconscious cannot reasonably 
have a significant role. 
The cooperation between consciousness and the unconscious points to a second argument 
why consciousness must not be controlled by the subconscious. Neuroscience shows that 
a significant part of the 'processors' of the brain used for conscious thought are also used 
for unconscious processes (Dehaene, 2014). This provides support for that not only global 
neural processes of consciousness but also those of subconsciousness are ontologically 
emergent. Thus, whereas deterministic processes (in the adequate sense, as discussed 
above) contribute to communication between consciousness and the unconscious, the 
latter is not deterministically controlling consciousness. As pointed out, experience shows 
that we can consciously cancel impulsive intentions, using our "free won't" (Libet, 1985).  
From another perspective, we do not necessarily need to make a distinction between 
consciousness and the subconscious as clearly separated global systems. Already 
individual neurological subsystems associated with the mind appear to be sufficiently 
complex to render their interaction ontologically emergent. In the subject of game theory 
similar results have, interestingly enough, been found. Emergent behaviour has been 
observed in simulations of nonlinear interaction between two players, who both act in 
order to optimize their game while trying to act unpredictable for the opponent, if players 
are allowed to make use of the game's history (West and Lebiere, 2001). 
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A complication related to the distinction between subconscious and conscious choices is 
what we might call 'character decisions'. Based on previous experience and reflections, 
people accumulate different positions or traits of character that could lead to routine 
behaviour in certain situations. Facing an approaching threatening individual, for 
example, certain people will normally escape while others preferably stay to deal with the 
danger. This behaviour does not necessarily constitute an active conscious choice of the 
type we have discussed so far, but may rather be a result of the individual's disposition to 
act in such situations. Since the individual normally is aware of her traits of character, we 
here consider the nature of character decisions to be conscious rather than unconscious. 
Our feelings, thoughts and choices do not simply happen to us. They arise from basic 
neural processes related to our minds and are developed emergently in a cooperation 
between consciousness and the unconscious. But how, then, can our thoughts and feelings 
take form in a structured and coherent way? How can the individual carry out her 
intentions unruled by the subconscious? These important questions are not analyzed here; 
of prime interest for the question of free will is that thoughts and feelings arise in a 
manner which is neither determinable nor controllable.  
 
5  Discussion 
The results of this work unequivocally point towards non-reductive physicalism; mental 
states supervene on physical states but cannot be reduced to them. We may ask what the 
consequences are for causal closedness, that is the thesis that no physical events have 
causes beyond the physical world. Our answer is that the physical world really is causally 
closed in the ontological sense because we have every reason to regard it as causal; every 
physical state leads, in accord with the laws of nature, to a new state. For simpler, low-
level systems, new states are in principle predetermined and sometimes even computable. 
The human brain employs deterministic low-level processes at the neural level for thought 
processes, carrying out certain actions (somatic nervous system) and for reflexes 
(autonomic nervous system). But as we have shown, this does not mean that all systems in 
the physical world are deterministically controlled. Emergence can alter the situation. 
Consciousness, which we have shown to be ontologically emergent, is such a high-level 
system. From an epistemic perspective this means that the possibility for conclusions 
about the causal functionality of mental systems are limited. The situation is reminiscent 
of that of mathematics for which Gödel proved that there are true theorems in the system 
that are unprovable because of its complexity. 
We can now explain why emergence does not cause overdetermination with regards to the 
causal situation for consciousness (Kim, 2006). It has been argued that if the dynamics of 
consciousness is determined by its current state plus the laws of nature, then emergent 
phenomena cannot exist independently; they must be a result of the conditions already 
provided. Otherwise we seem to be facing an overdetermined problem. The solution to the 
dilemma is that the emergent properties are of the same nature as those new conditions 
that may present themselves when a closed system is transformed to an open system. They 
are thus additional conditions, being governed by associated additional relations. 
Mathematically speaking, just as many new equations are added as new variabless. Thus 
overdetermination is avoided. For the example of the person being in a closed room, this 
could correspond to the door being opened. Emergent properties have thus, as far as 
deterministic control is concerned, the same impact on the development of the system as 
external influences have on an open system. This solution to the problem of 
overdetermination also explains how 'downward causation' (Kim, 2006) can take place. 
Interacting emergent phenomena can determine the development of the system (in this 
case, the mind) independently of the causal situation at lower levels. 
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What is then the implication for compatibilism; the position that determinism is 
compatible with free will? Interestingly, whether compatibilism or incompatibilism holds 
is not relevant here. Even though neural low-level processes are deterministic, high-level 
cognitive phenomena are ontologically indeterminable and uncontrollable in spite of 
being defined by low-level processes. The point of transition is, as we have seen, 
governed by the amount of information that can principally be stored and processed in a 
physical system. This also illustrates the point that in a physicalistic view of the world, 
determinism or indeterminism has no bearing its reductive character; it is emergence that 
renders physicalism nonreductive.   
Finally, how do these results relate to epiphenomenalism, the notion that mental states are 
only by-products of the physical states and unable to causally influence these? To answer 
this question, we need to note that the form of non-reductive physicalism assumed here is 
not a form of property dualism. Although mental states are not deducible from basic 
neurological states, they certainly directly correspond to physical states; they supervene 
on these. Non-reductionism follows because of the emergent character of mental states, 
not because of lack of correspondence between physical and mental states. Thus 
epiphenomenalism is ruled out here.  
 
6  Conclusion 
In a physicalist analysis of the mind-body problem, resting on results from mathematics 
and physics, the concepts of algorithmic information theory and emergence are used to 
argue that the problem is unsolvable. The vast neural complexity of the brain is the basic 
obstacle; from a thought experiment it is shown that even a much simpler but related 
nonlinear system may exhibit epistemically strongly emergent properties. Reductionistic 
understanding of consciousness is thus not possible. Neuroscience will continue to make 
progress - we will almost certainly find, for example, the cognitive centra that are active at 
certain stimuli or thought processes - but emergent cognitive phenomena like qualia or 
introspection will not be expressed in a theory. The 'explanatory gap' cannot be bridged. 
From a scientifically and methodologically more useful definition of free will than the 
traditional it is subsequently argued that high-level neural cognitive processes are 
ontologically open, even though underlying physical laws and lower-level processes are 
deterministic. As a consequence conscious processes are not determinable, not even in 
principle. Thus, the three requirements for free will suggested here are satisfied; that the 
individual's actions take place on the basis of its intentions, that these intentions have not 
been subconsciously forced onto the individual and that the individual behaves as an 
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